BATTLiE OF PRINCETON 

A PRELIMINAIIY STUDV 



The Battle of Princeton 

A Preliminary Study 



ALFRED A. WOODHULL 



PRINCETON, N. J. 

W. C. SINCLAIR 

I913 



Copyright, 1913, 
By Alfred A. Woodhull, 



PRINCETON, N. J. 

THE FALCON PRESS 

I913 



ffH/S 



©CI.A332834 



To 

The Society of Sons of the Revolution in New Jersey 



NOTE. 

The object of this essay is to describe the tactical 
operations in the engagement near Princeton, on the third 
of January, 1777. It is a study preliminary to a fuller dis- 
cussion of that short Jersey campaign ; and it is put forth 
in this form and at this time expressly to elicit and invite 
criticism and, if possible, to draw out authorities, published 
or still in manuscript, that may throw more light on the 
situation. 

Princeton was not a great battle from the point of 
numbers engaged or of casualties suffered. But it was a 
great battle when its consequences are considered ; when 
the influence of that victory upon the military history of the 
Revolution is weighed ; and especially when one reflects 
upon the inevitable political result that would have followed 
a defeat upon that field. 

No one can write of these movements without recog- 
nizing the importance of the late General W. S. Stryker's 
investigation of the subject, and feeling serious obligation 
to him, an obligation that I gratefully express. I am glad 
also to acknowledge indebtedness for cordial cooperation and 
very intelligent comment to my friend Walter Hart Olden, 
whose family has lived in the neighborhood since 1696. Mr. 
Olden has freely placed at my disposal farm maps, field 
notes of old surveys, and neighborhood traditions which 
have been exceedingly valuable. 

A. A. W. 

Princeton, 
February 12th. 19 13. 



The Battle of Princeton 
A Preliminary Study 

The military situation on the evening of the second of 
January, 1777, which led to the engagement near Princeton 
the next day, was this : Lord Cornwallis with a considerable 
force had reached Princeton on the first, and proceeded 
toward Trenton on the second, of January. He took with 
him von Donop's brigade of Hessians, that had been in 
Princeton since December twenty-eighth, and left in that 
village a British brigade temporarily commanded by Lt. 
Col. Mawhood. Of this brigade, the 17th and 55th Foot 
were to follow the next morning, and the 40th, quartered in 
the college, was to remain there in garrison. He also left 
Leslie's brigade for the time at Maidenhead (Lawrence- 
ville). The only direct route to Trenton was the Post 
Road, which crossed Stony Brook by a bridge at Worth's 
Mill and ran through Lawrenceville. Cornwallis was de- 
layed by a detaining force beyond Lawrenceville, and did 
not reach Trenton until nearly sunset, or between four and 
five o'clock. The weather was warm and oppressive for 
the season ; it had rained, the road was deep with mud, and 
the smaller streams were running nearly, or quite, bank-full 
under the influence of the thaw. The British column was 
about 8,000 strong and it immediately made an ineffectual 
attempt to cross the Assunpink, a small stream, whose left 
bank the Americans held, that enters the Delaware after 
bounding Trenton on the southeast. 

Washington had with him a few small Continental 
regiments, and a considerable number of militia drawn from 
Philadelphia and South Jersey, the total being about four 
thousand men, imperfectly equipped and clothed. For rea- 
sons not necessary to rehearse here, it was imperative that 
the Americans should leave the British vicinity in the course 
of the night ; and providentially for this movement a sudden 



8 

and severe change in the weather made the roads, that were 
ahnost bottomless, rough but adamantine tracks. Accord- 
ingly about one o'clock in the morning, after what heavy 
baggage there was had been sent toward Burlington, the 
troops were adroitly and silently withdrawn from the line 
of the Assunpink and set in motion for the Quaker Bridge 
on the upper reaches of that creek. This bridge was on the 
Quaker Road, the travelled route between the Friends' 
Meetings of Stony Brook and Crosswicks. Between Tren- 
ton and the bridge were merely country ways, difficult for 
wheeled transportation, narrow, rough, irregular, obstructed 
by stumps, cut into ruts, and used only for short sections of 
neighborhood communication and not for travel to Prince- 
ton or New Brunswick. North of the Quaker Bridge the 
road was comparatively direct and plain, but still very infe- 
rior and not a highway in any proper sense. 

Washington's purpose was a double one ; to evacuate 
his absolutely untenable position, and to surprise the minor 
post of Princeton and possibly seize the military depot at 
New Brunswick. Not long before sunrise he passed Stony 
Brook at the point where the bridge near the canal now 
spans it, about a third of a mile from Port Mercer, since 
established, and a very little more than a mile south of the 
Meeting House, still standing. After crossing, he divided 
the command into three columns.' One, the First Division, 
under Maj. Gen. Sullivan, was to move by the right to 
Princeton and approach it on the reverse, or south, side. 
Sullivan left the Quaker Road about 500 yards from the 
Meeting House, passed behind (south of) a thick wood, 
apparently made use of cleared fields for easier progress, 
and inclined to the left so as to enter the way used by 
Friends from Princeton going across country to Meeting, 
as they sometimes did in preference to taking the longer 
route by the formal highway. Certainly, when Mercer be- 

^ Rodney. Memoirs Long Island Historical Society. Vol. III., 
Part II., pp. 158-9; also Stryker, Battles of Trenton and Princeton, 
p. 438. 



came engaged he was on one of the Clarkes' farms, but not 
immediately at the southern base of the ridge on which the 
house stands. Two brigades, forming the Second Division, 
were to move to the left and enter the village from the west, 
but on the way to break the wooden bridge over Stony 
Brook at Worth's Mill on the main road, and to post a party 
there to delay any force that might arrive in pursuit. Brig. 
Gen. Mercer, with the Third Division, also of two brigades, 
was "to march straight on to Princeton, without turning to 
the right or left." The commander of the Second Division 
who was to break the bridge, leave a rear-guard there, and 
proceed to Princeton, has not yet been identified ; but it is 
believed that he was Maj. Gen. Greene. Had he broken 
the bridge, obviously his course toward the town would 
have been over the Post Road. It clearly was Washington's 
design to mark out a military triangle with a comparatively 
narrow base, (Sullivan left the road about three- fourths of 
a mile from the Mill,) the two sides, Sullivan's and, as we 
suppose, Greene's, columns, converging at the apex, Prince- 
ton. The triangle was bisected by Mercer's column moving 
midway between the others to unite with them finally at the 
critical position. This was a modification, conforming to 
the topographical situation, of the attack on Trenton eight 
days earlier. It had the advantage of using three lines of 
march, thus shortening by one-third the long drawn-out and 
slender formation in which the army had moved from Tren- 
ton, and of keeping the three columns within supporting 
distance of each other. But as a matter of fact no Ameri- 
cans reached the bridge before the battle, although the inter- 
ruption of hostile communication by its destruction would 
have been eminently desirable. Inasmuch as no further 
mention is made of the column sent to the left, and as 
Greene, who would have been its natural commander, is 
known to have been in the culminating fight, we are required 
to assume : Either ( i ) that Rodney was mistaken and such 
a Division was not sent; or (2) that it was recalled soon 
after it had started; or (3) that its commander observed 



Mawliood's movement and promptly and properly retraced 
his steps so as to rejoin Washington and thus reinforce 
Sullivan's First Division. In either case Mercer's Third 
Division became simply a flanking column to the main body 
and would serve as a first line of battle if attacked from 
the left, as proved the case. In that view, had time allowed, 
Mercer should have retired, skirmishing, on the main body. 
But the contact between the two columns was not effective, 
and certainly no warning was sent from the rear after 
Mawhood's approach was observed. 

It now is necessary to examine the British situation. 
Lt. Col. Mawhood. who had been left at Princeton over 
night with orders to proceed early the next morning to 
Trenton with a part of his brigade, drew out in the short 
dawn twilight and as the sun rose was ascending the hill 
immediately beyond Worth's Mill. He had with him the 
17th Foot, a small part of the 55th Foot, a troop" of the i6th 
Light Dragoons, and two pieces of artillery. The greater 
part of the 55th, under the command of Major Cornelius 
Cuyler, was nearly, or quite, a mile in the rear. When 
near the house on the summit, then belonging to William 
Millette, but whose site is now that of Mrs. Schirmer's, 
chance observation toward the east disclosed a distant body 
of American troops and the commanding officer, assuming 
that these were fugitives from Trenton, immediately coun- 
termarched with the view of cutting them off. It is not 
certainly known which Division he discovered. Wilkinson, 
then an aide to St. Clair, while near the head of Sullivan's 
First Division, saw the British in the act of countermarch- 
ing and believed that it was St. Clair's own troops that had 
been observed." The morning was cold and clear and, when 
the woods did not intercept the view, moving objects could 
be detected at a long distance. It seems probable that a 

* Wilkinson. Memoirs, I., p. 144, says "three troops." 
^Memoirs (1816) I., p. 141. 



part of Sullivan's command came into view when passing 
across a cleared space not far from and southeast of Thomas 
Clarke's house. At all events Mawhood moved rapidly 
down the hill, crossed the bridge at the Mill, and at the first 
convenient point turned to the southeast. What was his 
real objective is not now known, but the first command that 
he encountered was Mercer's, on the ground of William 
Clarke, now owned by M. T. Pyne and H. B. Owsley. 
Marshall * says : The British had discovered troops advanc- 
ing on their left, in a direction which would enter the road 
in their rear and, having repassed Stony Brook, they "moved 
under cover of a copse of woods toward the Americans 
whose van was conducted by General Mercer. A sharp 
action ensued," etc. He does not specify where this occur- 
red, and leaves it to be inferred that Mawhood met the head 
of a nearly continuous column ; for he goes on to say ' that 
"The main body of the army led by Gen. Washington in 
person followed close in the rear." An obvious error. 
There is a moral certainty that at no point of his earlier 
progress had Mercer been observed. Had his Division been 
seen while still on the Quaker Road between the Meeting 
House and the Mill, Mawhood would have recognized that 
the bridge was in danger and would have arranged to defend 
it. The same would be the case had he seen the Second 
Division, which we suppose Greene to be commanding. It 
is much more probable that he did observe Sullivan's First 
Division in the distance, directed his course to intercept it, 
and unexpectedly clashed with Mercer. On the other hand 
Wilkinson,' writing forty years after the event, notes that 
the main column, that is Sullivan's, wheeled to the right, 
and says : "Gen. Mercer with a command not exceeding 
350 men, [which must mean Mercer's own brigade and 

* Life of Washington, ist Ed. (1805) II., p. 506. 

' (p. 507-) 

"Memoirs (1816) I., p. 141. 



neglects Cadwalader's attached militia] marched immediately 
up Stony Brook, as I was informed at the time, to take pos- 
session of the bridge." After reporting that he himself had 
observed the British near Cochran's (i. e., Millette's) house 
and saw their abrupt return, Wilkinson continues (p. 142) 
"When Col. Mawhood . . . discovered the head of our 
column he did not perceive Gen. Mercer [nor any other 
troops] marching up the creek near its left bank and . . . 
he determined to retrograde and cut us up, nor had Gen. 
Mercer any suspicion of the presence of Mawhood's corps, 
until he [Mawhood] recrossed Stony Brook, when a mutual 
discovery was made at less than five hundred yards distance, 
and the respective corps then endeavored to get possession 
of the high ground on their [the American] right." The 
last clause is certainly an error, and the whole paragraph 
appears to be unintentionally misleading. Unless Wilkin- 
son, then a young aide to Gen. St. Clair, himself heard 
Washington's order and remembered it correctly, there is 
no particular presumption in favor of this account of 
Mercer's course, which seems to be the foundation of the 
popular belief to-day. Without doubt Mercer moved a 
short distance up the road along the brook before turning 
toward Princeton ; but as Wilkinson was very near the head 
of Sullivan's column he could have had no personal knowl- 
edge of how far the Third Division kept to that road, nor 
could he have seen what became of the Second Division. 
If Mercer while still on the Quaker Road had discovered 
Mawhood at any point, it is incredible that word was not 
sent back to Washington, who was with Sullivan not far 
away, that a hostile force of the three arms was on the left 
flank. Nor would a prudent officer — and Mercer was pru- 
dent as well as brave — voluntarily have challenged such a 
foe in an exposed and isolated position, certainly without 
notifying the commanding general. No, neither Mercer nor 
Mawhood knew of the other's proximity then. 



13 

When Mawhood's infantry accompanied by guns and 
horse recrossed Stony Brook, the topographical situation 
was this : For nearly half a mile the Post Road was much 
lower than the ground on either border, excepting for a strip 
on the southerly side. Through this strip a small water- 
course, now somewhat larger from careful drainage into it 
and impounded into two or three little ponds, ran to empty 
into Stony Brook immediately below the bridge. The 
Quaker Road, which enters the Post Road at the bridge, 
probably crossed the tributary on a ruder structure than the 
present masonry arch, and the bluff along whose base the 
Quaker Road passes was quite impracticable for guns and 
probably for cavalry. At that time the banks of the name- 
less rivulet were low and marshy and, overflowed in the 
recent thaw, what ice had formed could not have sustained 
troops, even had the further high ground invited immediate 
approach. About 350 yards from its mouth this streamlet 
is spanned by a causeway, the outlet upon the highway for 
the farming land beyond. A hundred yards lower down is 
a similar causeway. It is not known whether both of these 
approaches were standing at that time, but it is beyond any 
question that Mawhood must have used at least one of them 
to reach the plateau over which he passed in his effort to 
intercept Sullivan. This is confirmed by the unknown 
author of a manuscript in Princeton University Library,' 
who at the time was in a house about 400 yards from the 
line of battle which Mawhood formed when he unexpectedly 
met Mercer. The narrator reports that the troops unslung 
their knapsacks in his field and formed at the corner of his 
garden 60 yards from the door.* They then marched to 
William Clarke's wheatfield and the orchard about Clarke's 
house. The probable site of the narrator's house, which is 
no longer standing, is marked (N) on the map. It does 

''A Brief Narrative of British Ravages. Published by the 
Princeton Historical Association. 1906. 

' p. 35- 



14 

not follow that when Mawhood relieved his men of their 
packs and "formed", as observed by the eye-witness, that it 
was because he already knew of Mercer's propinquity. He 
had reached cleared fields, his men could leave their burdens 
in safety for the time, and there was every reason for him 
to advance unencumbered against the fleeing foe, as he be- 
lieved it was, with a broader front than that of the column 
of files which he probably used upon the road. For conve- 
nience in marching we may readily suppose that the infantry 
formed into what was then known as a column of ranks, 
which could readily develop a battle front when required. 
When Mawhood approached the apple orchard, north and 
northwest of Clarke's house, he formed line of battle because 
by that time he had learned that an American command was 
near. We believe that Mercer had marched directly away 
from the Quaker Road and nearly at a right angle to it, in 
conformity with his orders as reported by Rodney. In that 
case he would have followed the natural grade, parallel to 
and a very little south of the existing road laid out in 1807. 
He certainly would have avoided the high ground further to 
the left, because the whole movement was designed to be a 
surprise and troops on that ridge would have been visible 
from the Post Road. If he kept well below the higher level 
he need not have been seen from that direction, nor would 
he himself necessarily have observed an enemy moving over 
the more distant part of those fields. Further, the beginning 
of his progress across Thomas Clarke's farm was probably 
through woods, the first cleared ground being that which 
became the battle-field. Mercer, with his own brigade under 
Col. Haslet, was south of William Clarke's house and near 
the farm buildings before he recognized the British. It is 
probable that Mawhood had not discovered him until a little 
before that very time. The Americans immediately entered 
the orchard, which was enclosed by a heavy hedge. It is 
possible that Mercer intended to use this hedge as an ob- 
stacle against the dragoons ; and the apprehension of a 
mounted charge may have deterred him from falling back 



IS 

on the main body, which would have been the obvious course 
in the face of a foe numerically as strong and better discip- 
lined and equipped. However, the dragoons seem to have 
taken little active part; unless, dragoon-like, they partici- 
pated dismounted. But that has not been reported, and it is 
improbable. They had no recognized casualties and, be- 
cause mounted, they escaped in safety toward Trenton when 
the day finally went against them. 

There is some discrepancy in the accoimts as to which 
force fired first, but Mercer seems to have taken the offen- 
sive. Three volleys are reported as having been given and 
an equal number at once returned. At that period troops 
were formed for battle in three ranks, which fired in rapid 
succession ; so it is probable that the three volleys repre- 
sented one discharge from each rank. Immediately upon 
firing the British fixed bayonets and began a charge before 
which the Americans, indifferently supplied with that 
weapon, retired in confusion. While this was going on 
Captain Daniel Neil, of the Eastern Company of New 
Jersey Artillery, unlimbered his two guns outside the 
orchard on the left of the infantry and opened with canister 
on the British right, a grenadier company. But Neil was 
killed by the return fire and the guns were temporarily lost 
in the charge. Wilkinson (p. 142) says Mawhood's guns 
were on his right ; that is, opposite Neil's. In this encounter 
and immediately afterward several officers were slain ; 
Gen. Mercer himself was mortally wounded and Col. 
Haslet, the immediate brigade commander, was killed 
while attempting to hold and rally the men. This phase 
of the action and the unchecked flight of that part 
of Mercer's division occurred within a very few min- 
utes. But just as the Continentals were pouring down 
the slope, the Second Brigade of that Division, Cad- 
walader's Philadelphia militia, which had lost distance, 
emerged from a wood and appeared on the lower ground. 
This led the British to halt and a small portion of them to 
take a position behind a fence and a ditch, in front of the 



i6 

farm buildings and nearly parallel to the present road. Here 
their line was extended, probably in a single rank, which 
allowed a broader field of fire. Gen. Cadwalader, with great 
daring but not with equal judgment, led his command on 
the field apparently in column of files, as it had been march- 
ing, and then endeavored to form a column of divisions in 
the face of the enemy and under a fire of grape. But his 
companies were thrown into disorder and, mingling with the 
retreating First Brigade, fled in confusion, abandoning one 
piece of artillery." Both Generals Washington and Greene 
then appeared on the scene and, with Gen. Cadwalader, 
freely exposed themselves in an unsuccessful attempt to rally 
the fugitives, the most of whom bore off into the woods on 
their new right front (their former left rear) and swarmed 
past the Thomas Clarke house. By this time the main col- 
umn behind the rising ground had been moved by the flank 
and formed in a three-rank line of battle on the ridge to the 
east of Clark's house, with Moulder's " battery, of the Phila- 
delphia Associators, between the dwelling and the infantry. 
(The gun Cadwalader lost but recovered later, was prob- 
ably one of Moulder's.) 

The situation was now alarming for Washington's 
army, and momentously critical for the Government it sup- 
ported. This was the only organized command of any 
importance left in the field. If it should be routed, it could 
not be re-assembled nor could any new army be created; 
and, like every other government, the Continental Congress 
could not sustain itself without armed support. Those tired 
men waiting on that low ridge were the Revolution's last 
hope. In their immediate front, almost under their very 
eyes, two defeats had been sustained within the last few 
minutes ; the fugitives had swept past them if not actually 
between their files, almost in panic, and the victorious sol- 
diers of the king flushed with triumph were before their 

'Rodney. Stryker, p. 439. 

" Stryker, p. 284. 



17 

faces. Those halted bayonets represented successful force, 
and the challenging colors carried the prestige of uninter- 
rupted victory. The invincibility of British arms was a 
tradition upon which the colonials had been nurtured. Well 
might the patriot generals, appreciating the far-reaching 
consequences of a third defeat, tremble for the steadiness of 
this last reserve. As the new line came into view Mawhood 
had checked the pursuit, to re-form his battalion disordered 
by its very triumph. It may well be also that, startled by 
the sight of this unanticipated reserve, he may have hesi- 
tated to attack again. But there was little option. The 
short range of fire had of necessity permitted a very close 
approach, and to withdraw, even if so disposed, would be 
as hazardous as to advance. But notwithstanding the longer 
line to be overcome, and we know that a part at least of 
Mercer's two brigades had been rallied beyond the slope 
and then advanced to extend the front of those not yet 
engaged, there is no reason to suppose that there was any 
essential hesitation ; for, still under the stimulus of success, 
he started with trifling delay to crown his advantage with 
final" and complete victory. The proximity of the hostile 
lines is shown by the retort thrown back to Captain Fleming, 
who, ordering his V'irginians to dress before making ready 
to fire, was taunted wdth the cry "We'll dress you !" shouted 
across the narrow interval. Notwithstanding their smaller 
number the British gallantly formed and apparently intended 
to cover their advance by their own musketry. Their artil- 
lery was in action, their dragoons are presumed to have 
hovered near, and the greater part of the Fifty-fifth was 
known to be not far away, although it does not appear to 
have become engaged. The Americans, more numerous but 
shaken by their reverses and fearfully overmatched in arma- 
ment and discipline, that great factor of military success, 
awaited the attack. At that instant Washington rode to 
the front, an example and an inspiration, challenging death 
in exposure to the double fire which at once broke forth. 
That was the critical moment of the Revolution. The slight 



18 

eminence along which the defence was aligned was the 
moral watershed from which ultimate victory or final defeat 
for the cause of Independence would flow as the consequence 
of the engagement then imminent. This silent but eloquent 
appeal to the military spirit and patriotic valor of his men 
was effective. They advanced firing. Hand with his Penn- 
sylvania riflemen on the extreme right wheeled to the left 
and threatened Mawhood's flank, always a vulnerable point, 
and with St. Clair's brigade discouraged Cuyler and the 
Fifty-fifth, which one account says was endeavoring to 
connect with its detached fragment that had been acting 
with the Seventeenth from the beginning. It is very doubt- 
ful whether that regiment seriously sought to enter the 
fight. On the left in the line of battle Hitchcock, a despe- 
rate invalid, with his New England Continental brigade and 
Cadwalader's partly restored Philadelphians, further sup- 
ported by Mifilin, pressed the enemy's right. Displaying 
equal courage but against greater odds, the enemy was 
overcome, broke, and retired, at first fighting unavailingly 
but soon in rout. He left his artillery, his knapsacks, every- 
thing but his honor. From the time that Mawhood met 
Mercer until he fell back from Washington it was fifteen 
minutes, but fifteen minutes that covered a crisis big with 
fate. The field was indeed a stricken one, each side van- 
quished in turn. The Americans recovered their materiel, 
but their slain fought again only as their heroic death 
animated the survivors and drew recruits to avenge their 
loss. In the retreat the dragoons galloped across the yet 
undamaged bridge and made their way toward Maidenhead 
(Lawrenceville) ; some of the infantry fled directly across 
country toward the Cedar Grove region of Rocky Hill, and 
doubtless ultimately reached New Brunswick by way of 
the lower Millstone." Many were captured. The tale of 

" One group, apparently striving to reach Coryell's Ferry 
(Lambertville) on the Delaware, was overtaken by a pursuing party, 
or was cut off by local militia suddenly mobilized, near Mount Rose, 
and six were slain. 



19 

prisoners was considerable. That part of the Fifty-fifth, 
under Major Cuyler, that was not engaged fell back to the 
Post Road, returned rapidly to Princeton, assembled the 
Fortieth and united with it. The baggage, which we are 
bound to suppose was between the wings of the second 
regiment, had already escaped toward Trenton by the good 
management of Captain Scott, of the Seventeenth, who was 
complimented therefor by General Howe. Hastily clearing 
the field of its wounded and its transportable spoil, and 
giving direction for the burial of the dead, Washington de- 
tached a party to break down the bridge at the Mill, thus 
materially delaying the British on their return from Tren- 
ton, sent his army on to Princeton over the "back road", 
the Friends' shorter way, as originally planned, and he 
himself led the twenty men of the Philadelphia Troop, his 
only mounted force, over the broken ground toward Cedar 
Grove after the fugitives. It was a very whimsical adven- 
ture in which he engaged, not comparable to any other 
reported experience during the war. The exhilarating pur- 
suit, which he likened to a fox-chase, seems to have been the 
reaction from the crushing responsibility that had been 
pressing upon him. 

Under the reports of the distraught Fifty-fifth, which 
not unnaturally fancied that the whole Rebel army was at 
its heels on the main road, the two royal regiments made 
a hasty exit from the village, endeavoring to escape by the 
same "back road" up which Sullivan and Greene were ad- 
vancing. Consequently the two columns met on opposite 
sides of the ravine south of the Theological Seminary and 
east of the Graduate College. When the Americans de- 
ployed and started to advance, the British precipitately 
retired before the much stronger force, which closely fol- 
lowed them. They must have passed just south of the 
present grounds of the Seminary, over the fields along the 
general course of the present Dickinson Street, across the 
sites of the railroad station, Blair Arch, and West College, 
into the back campus. A part took refuge in Nassau Hall, 



but the most streamed north along the direct road to Rocky 
Hill and thence eastward to New Brunswick. Two or three 
shots were fired, it is said from Captain Alexander Hamil- 
ton's two-gun New York Company of Artillery, at the south 
face of the college. A persistent tradition maintains that 
one ball passed through the south window of the chapel 
(enlarged and transformed into the present Faculty Room) 
and carried the portrait of George H from the frame which 
now holds a composite picture of Washington, Mercer and 
the field. When not overgrown with ivy, the scar of another 
wound may be observed on the second story, midway be- 
tween the middle of the two windows that are next the 
Faculty Room on the west. After that show of overwhelm- 
ing force what remained of the garrison surrendered, and 
Witherspoon's college, a cradle of constitutional statesman- 
ship, was definitely freed from such occupation. The 
American loss in the battle was thirty enlisted men killed 
and thirty wounded, and eight officers killed. The remark- 
able proportion of fatalities attests the severity of the com- 
bat. The British left a hundred on the field, and altogether 
lost three hundred prisoners, of whom fourteen were officers. 
No one was killed or wounded elsewhere than as already 
described. 

Washington rejoined after the surrender on the campus, 
and hastened to use for the first time the Post Road. The 
mounted advance of Cornwallis's army of rescue came 
within sight of Washington's retiring forces across the 
Millstone at Kingston, after the bridge there had been taken 
up. Before it was repaired the Americans moved north on 
their way to Morristown, and the British when they crossed 
went directly to New Brunswick, to save their base. At no 
time in this January campaign did our troops traverse, nor 
was a musket fired on, the Post Road between the College 
and Trenton, excepting in the skirmish, almost bloodless, 
while the bridge at the Stony Brook Mill was being broken. 
After Washington left Princeton one shot was thrown down 
the road at the head of the approaching British column. 



possibly by a straggler, more probably by a local militiaman 
or a civilian, from a British cannon kept loaded on one of 
the two earthworks that von Donop, remembering Rail's 
defencelessness at Trenton, had set up. This stood on the 
southern edge of the road, directly opposite the property 
now belonging to Mr. Garrett. The discharge temporarily 
checked the advance, until a reconnoissance showed that 
Washington would not defend Princeton. It should be 
needless to say, were not the question so often asked, that 
the road in extension of Mercer Street and the bridge which 
carries it over Stony Brook played no part in these opera- 
tions, for the unanswerable reason that the road was not 
laid out nor the bridge built until 1807. 

The field of Princeton remains practically as it lay 
under the tread of war. The turnpike road, now better 
known as the Mercer Street extension, has made a compara- 
tively deep cutting diagonally through the first line of battle. 
The orchard and remnants of its surrounding hedge, stand- 
ing within reasonable memory, have disappeared. William 
Clarke's simple wooden house, which was crowded with 
wounded after the combats, has been replaced by a greater 
one of stone on nearly the same spot. A forest that appears 
to have stood on Thomas Clarke's farm, south of the road, 
and perhaps have encroached to the east on ground partly 
cleared before the Revolution, is represented by one or two 
straggling oaks. Thomas Clarke's house, newly built shortly 
before the war, consecrated by the sacrifice of Mercer dying 
within its doors, is substantially unchanged excepting that 
what was the rear has now been made the front. With 
these trifling differences the visitor of to-day sees the terrain 
precisely as it was when Mercer fell, when Haslet and Neil 
and Fleming, Shippin, Yeates, Morris and Read were killed 
or mortally wounded ; when defeat drew the patriot army 
backward to the very brink of ruin and Washington's invin- 
cible courage and superb self-control neutralized the impend- 
ing catastrophe, turned disaster into triumph, and forever 
closed the way to military intrusion. When Mawhood's 



M^ U ^^ 



redcoats failed to carry that gentle but rifle-crowned slope, 
there broke upon the world a victory farther reaching even 
than its great successor on the slope of Gettysburg. To-day 
that field lies bare, wholly unmarked save by a pyramid of 
modern shell to indicate where it was supposed Mercer's 
blood followed the bayonets' thrusts. Elsewhere headquar- 
ters are jealously preserved, marching routes and river 
crossings bear their mementoes, towering shafts and carven 
allegories dot the landscape, but there is not an object, not 
even a guide-board, to suggest to the inquirer, still less to the 
casual stranger, that this is Princeton's battle-ground, the 
narrow arena on which was decided the fate of the republic. 



PRINCETON BATTLE FIELD 




COPrRIGHT 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



009 252 949 6 



I 



